

SPEAKING TO KINGS: HESIOD'S *AINOS* AND THE RHETORIC OF ALLUSION IN THE *WORKS AND DAYS**

νῦν δ' αἶνον βασιλεῦς' ἐρέω, φρονέουσι καὶ αὐτοῖς.
ὦδ' ἵρηξ προσέειπεν ἀηδόνα ποικιλόδειρον,
ὕψι μάλ' ἐν νεφέεσσι φέρων, ὀνύχεσσι μεμαρπώς·
ἡ δ' ἐλεόν, γναμπτοῖσι πεπαρμένη ἀμφ' ὀνύχεσσιν,
μύρετο· τήν δ' ὁ γ' ἐπικρατέως πρὸς μῦθον εἶπεν·
'δαιμονίη, τί λέληκας; ἔχει νύ σε πολλὸν ἀρείων·
τῇ δ' εἰς ἣ σ' ἂν ἐγὼ περ ἄγω καὶ αἰοῖδον ἐοῦσαν·
δείπνον δ' αἶ κ' ἐθέλω ποιήσομαι ἡὲ μεθήσω.
ἄφρων δ' ὅς κ' ἐθέλη πρὸς κρείσσονας ἀντιφερίζειν·
νίκης τε στέρεται πρὸς τ' αἰσχεῖν ἄλγεα πάσχει.'
ὦς ἔφατ' ὠκυπέτης ἵρηξ, τανυσίπτερος ὄρνις.
ὦ Πέρση, σὺ δ' ἄκουε Δίκης, μηδ' ὕβριν ὀφέλλε· (Op. 202–13)¹

And now I will tell an *ainos* for kings who themselves understand. Thus said the hawk to the intricate-necked nightingale, while he carried her high up among the clouds, gripped fast in his talons, and she, pierced by his crooked talons, cried pitifully. But he, in his overwhelming might, addressed her: 'Good god, why are you screeching? A far stronger one now holds you fast, and you must go wherever I take you, singer though you are. And I will make a meal of you, if I wish, or I will let you go. He is a fool who wishes to set himself against the stronger, for he loses the victory and suffers pain besides his shame'. So said the swiftly flying hawk, the long-winged bird. But you, Perses, listen to *Dike* and do not foster *hubris*.

Hesiod's tale of the hawk and the nightingale has been a recurring subject of scholarly dispute,² especially due to the problematic disjunction between the hawk's internal assessment of the action and Hesiod's own external commentary.³ The specific addressees, the kings, and more generally Perses and the reader, must ascertain the meaning of the story by reconciling the two contradictory pronouncements of the hawk within the story and of Hesiod outside it.⁴ In this

* I would like to thank Deborah Steiner and Helene Foley for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.

¹ The texts used for quotations of Hesiod are M. L. West, *Hesiod. Works and Days* (Oxford, 1978) and M. L. West, *Hesiod. Theogony* (Oxford, 1966). All translations are my own.

² There have been numerous articles specifically concerning these dozen or so lines. For a comprehensive list, see the discussion of G.-J. van Dijk, *AINOI, LOGOI, MUTHOI: Fables in Archaic, Classical, and Hellenistic Greek Literature* (Leiden, 1997), 127–34.

³ This contradiction, which destroys the parallel that the tale invites the listener to draw between the animals within the story and human behaviour outside it, is also anomalous to the 'fable' genre: the parallelism between the action and the moral derived therefrom has been called 'the usual purpose of fables' (T. K. Hubbard, 'Hesiod's fable of the hawk and the nightingale reconsidered', *GRBS* 36 (1995), 161–71, at 163). The difficulty of interpretation is underlined by the lack of scholarly consensus on whether to include the subsequent moralising coda (lines 213–14) as part of the 'fable' proper.

⁴ The mutually exclusive pronouncements made by the hawk and the poet have encouraged contradictory readings attempting to draw analogies between the figures of the hawk and the nightingale and the major actors in the poem. For a detailed rehearsal of the various arguments and summary of the scholarship see Hubbard (n. 3), 161–3. However, because Hesiod specifically addresses his *ainos* to the kings and because he is preoccupied with the kings' use and abuse of power, especially in the subsequent section of the *Works and Days*, it is

article, I will argue that the passage can only be fully understood by according the term *αἶνος* its full semantic implications as a rhetorical marker which not only identifies the tale as a coded and ambiguous discourse, but one which also structures that discourse as a particularized intellectual and social relationship between the poet and his addressees in order to condition a 'proper' reading of the tale. By highlighting the coded nature of his tale through the use of that appellation, Hesiod encourages a sophisticated and allusive reading.⁵ This marker is therefore central to Hesiod's rhetorical strategy and to his larger didactic purpose.

The didactic effectiveness of the *αἶνος*, in turn, arises from its allusive evocation of two particular elements of the *Theogony*: the affinity Hesiod establishes in the beginning of that poem between kings and Zeus, and the Prometheus story at *Theogony* 521–5 which articulates a 'Theogonic' use of power appropriate for the gods, and for Zeus in particular. However, through the *αἶνος* Hesiod rejects that affinity as a rationale for the exercise of power by the kings in favour of an ethical system appropriate for humans in the *Works and Days*. Central to this shift in focus is the movement throughout the first part of the *Works and Days* away from the divine and towards the human, from a negative aetiology of the human condition as a state of suffering to a positive, protreptic advocacy of justice as an ameliorative necessity for that condition.

Although Hesiod's tale anticipates subsequent animal fables found in authors from Archilochus to Phaedrus, the earliest uses of the word *αἶνος* occur in connection with settings and types of speech which involve neither animals nor explicit moralising, aspects which are central to the 'genre' of fables termed *αἶνοι*, of which we have only later examples.⁶ Gregory Nagy has observed that the Homeric usages of the term can all be located within a semantic field conveying not only the basic notion of coded speech, but more specifically as descriptive of discourses which are invested with

natural to identify the hawk with the kings. In turn, Hesiod should readily be equated with the nightingale not only because he is a victim of arbitrary power manifested in the kings' corrupt judgment, but most explicitly because the use of the word *αἰοιδός*, the *vox propria* for the inspired bard throughout archaic poetry, to describe the nightingale is clearly a signal to identify the bird with the poet. (Note also the pun *ἠηδόνα/αἰοιδόν*, for which see L. Isebaert, 'Le rossignol et l'épervier (Hésiode, *Travaux* 202–213)', *LEC* 56:4 (1988), 369–77, at 370.) This is the traditional interpretation and is at least as old as the scholia (*Σ Op.* 202). See P. Pucci, *Hesiod and the Language of Poetry* (Baltimore, 1977), 76–8 who provides additional details supporting this identification, as well as the discussions of, e.g., M. Puelma, 'Sänger und König: Zum Verständnis von Hesiods Tierfabel', *MH* 29 (1972), 86–109 and M. Heath, 'Hesiod's didactic poetry', *CQ* 35 (1985), 245–63, at 249–50.

⁵ As articulated by P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque* (Paris, 1968) s.v. *ainos*: '*ainos* . . . se dit d'abord de paroles, de récits chargés de sens' and, further, '[l]es emplois divers des mots de cette famille se ramènent à la notion de dire des paroles chargées d'importance ou de sens . . .'. Thus, W. J. Verdenius, *A Commentary on Hesiod's Works and Days vv. 1–382*, (Leiden, 1985), 118 translates e.g. *αἶνος* at *Op.* 202 as 'tale with a hidden meaning' while Wilamowitz, *Hesiod's Erga* (Berlin, 1928), 64 comments: 'Es ist eigentlich keine Tierfabel, sondern nur ein Gleichnis.' Cf. also the related words *αἰνέω* and its compounds (*ἐπαίνέω*, *παραινέω*, etc.) and, of particular interest for this discussion, *αἰνίσσομαι* and *αἰνύμα*, 'riddling speech, speech with a hidden meaning'.

⁶ Hesiod's tale is the regular starting point for discussions of fables in antiquity, however *αἶνος* as 'animal fable' appears to be a rather late specialisation of the term: e.g. Arist. (*Rh.* 2.20, 1393a27–1394a18) refers to Aesop's stories as *λόγοι*. For discussions of the terminology of fables see F. R. Adrados, *History of the Graeco-Latin Fable*, vol. 1, tr. L. A. Ray (Boston, 1999), 3–8; G.-J. van Dijk 'Theory and terminology of the Greek fable', *Reinardus* 6 (1993), 171–83, esp. 178; and id., (n. 2), 79–82. The first (extant) formal definition of *αἶνος* restrictive to animals (and plants) is, in fact, Pseudo-Diogenian (2nd C.E.).

persuasive or affective agendas (that is, gifting, praise, criticism, etc.).⁷ Indeed, the very classification of Hesiod's tale under the rubric 'fable' may be seen as an anachronistic back-reading of the later technical usage of the word, which itself perhaps derived its more specific generic application under the influence of its very occurrence here in the *Works and Days*. However, while Hesiod is working with what was probably a very old animal story,⁸ which in itself may be called a 'fable', the use of the term *ainos* signals his reworking of that (perhaps) traditional fable as an enigmatic discourse within the context of his own narrative.⁹

By denoting a kind of multivalent speech which is both authoritative and ambiguous, the term *ainos* is prescriptive of a sophisticated level of reading due to its coded (indeed, oracular¹⁰) nature. Hesiod underscores the exclusivity of the discourse by addressing his *ainos* to the kings with the qualification *φρονέουσι καὶ αὐτοῖς* (*Op.* 202), a phrase which signals the difficulty of understanding which is inherent in Hesiod's telling and which challenges the addressees to apply their interpretative skills. The phrase posits a privileged connection between the poet and his denoted addressees, marking an exclusive and skilled intellectual relationship which presumes an equality of interpretative ability,¹¹ in particular distinguishing the 'smart' kings of line 202 from the foolish (*νήπιοι*) kings elsewhere.¹² By according an equality of status to the addressees, the poet thus reconfigures the typical asymmetric intellectual relationship presupposed for didactic poetry in

⁷ See G. Nagy, *The Best of the Achaeans* (Baltimore, 1979), 235–41, 281–3 and 313–16 (dealing specifically with Hesiod's *ainos*) and G. Nagy, 'Mythe et prose in Grèce archaïque: l'*AINOS*', in C. Calame (ed.), *Métamorphoses du mythe en Grèce antique* (Geneva, 1989). Nagy provides the most insightful discussions of the term *ainos*, but E. Hofmann, *Qua ratione EPOS, MUTHOS, AINOS, LOGOS in antiquo Graecorum sermone adhibita sint* (diss. Göttingen, 1922), repr. in *Early Greek Thought: Three Studies* (New York, 1987) long ago discussed the term, anticipating the social and rhetorical implications which Nagy explicates in detail. It should be remembered that Aristotle, in the first theoretical discussion extant (*Rh.* 2.20, 1393a27–1394a18), classifies the *lógoi* of Aesop together with Socratic comparisons (*παραβολαί*) under the rubric of invented persuasive *exempla* (*παραδείγματα*), a subcategory of proofs (*πίστεις*). See van Dijk (n. 6), 179 and the recent discussion of Adrados (n. 6), 6 who concludes that '*ainos* is, then, a "story", but it may be a story that, rather than having a representative function, narrating something real or fictitious, has an impressive one: to advise, eulogize (and, of course, criticize)' [emphasis added].

⁸ See West (n. 1, 1978), 28.

⁹ Isebaert (n. 4), 376 puts it well: 'Contrairement à ce que l'on serait amené à croire, *ainos* ne signifie pas ici "fable"; au lieu d'être la désignation d'un genre littéraire spécifique ou d'une forme narrative, le mot renvoie, quel que soit le genre en question, à un mode d'expression, un style particulier, qui est indirect, allusif ou imagé.' The word 'enigmatic' is, of course, cognate with *ainos*.

¹⁰ As all coded speech is. See M.-C. Leclerc, 'L'épervier et le rossignol d'Hésiode: une fable à double sens', *REG* 105 (1992), 37–44, at 41 and M. Détienne, *The Masters of Truth in Archaic Greece*, tr. J. Lloyd (New York, 1996), *passim*, esp. ch. 4, 'The ambiguity of speech'.

¹¹ This is analogous to the 'built-in ideology of exclusiveness' which is central to the rhetoric of epinician praise poetry. Thus Pind. *Pyth.* 5.107: *ἐπαινέοντι συνετοί*, 'those who can understand give praise'. See Nagy (n. 7, 1979), 239–40.

¹² A disjunction is thus created by Hesiod between himself and the kings whom Hesiod in the *Theogony* had so closely equated with poets in their verbal and intellectual skills. In the *Works and Days* there are two kinds of kings marked in antithetically positive and negative terms. This is another doubling of the unitary identities found in the *Theogony*: just as there are two kinds of *ἔρις* in the *Works and Days*, so too there are two kinds of kings. See W. Nicolai, *Hesiods Erga, Beobachtungen zum Aufbau* (Heidelberg, 1964), 51.

which the poet plays the role of instructor in a superior position to the addressee who is pedagogically inferior.¹³

At the same time, the term *αἶνος* serves as a rhetorical marker denoting a type of speech which encodes an asymmetrical social relationship.¹⁴ The word locates the speaker in an inferior position, framing the discourse in a context of unequal power relations, the speaker rhetorically playing the inferior role in pursuit of a tangible gain.¹⁵ By signalling an inequality of social status between speaker and listener, the use of the word in effect constitutes a gesture of *captatio benevolentiae*. Thus, Hesiod frames a reading of his own tale which encourages the listener not only to be attuned to an implicit ulterior purpose but also to identify sympathetically with the weaker party of the tale. Such a rhetorical stance is necessary since Hesiod's role within the poem is that of mistreated litigant, a victim of arbitrary power figuratively manifested in the guise of the nightingale. By configuring a bond with his addressees which promotes a reading sympathetic to the nightingale's situation, the word *αἶνος* itself problematizes a simplistic initial reading of the tale. Hesiod's addressees, the kings, are obliquely prodded to sympathize with Hesiod *qua* nightingale despite their natural identification with the hawk, the figure of power. Hesiod thus encourages the kings to question the rationale for action expressed by the hawk and so to rethink their own assumptions about the use of power against the weak. In short, multiple nexuses of

¹³ In didactic poetry the 'bond of communication' is one of intelligence not *φιλότης*, as Nagy (n. 7, 1979), 241 asserts in the case of praise poetry. Indeed, the compound form *παραινέω* 'to instruct/advise' characterizes the didactic function of the *Works and Days* taken as a whole. This equation is stated explicitly of Hesiod in Pind. *Isthm.* 6.66–8: *Λάμπων δὲ . . . 'Ἡσιόδου μάλα τιμᾷ τοῦτ' ἔπος, νιοῖσί τε φράζων παραινεῖ . . .*, for which see Nagy (n. 7, 1979), 238.

¹⁴ This inequality of status appears to be a salient formal feature of any scene marked by the term, contra van Dijk (n. 6), 182 who asserts that 'this so-called "sociological" function has been overemphasized by some scholars'. However, considering Hesiod's social/rhetorical position in the poem, such a function here is not only logical but likely, given its rhetorical effectiveness. As Hofmann (n. 7), 52 observes: '*cum omnes loci comparationem contineant, notionem genuinam propono "dictum, cuius sententia e comparatione quadam pendet"*'. This inequality is a shared feature of all the Homeric instances: *Il.* 23.652, 23.795; *Od.* 21.110, and most explicitly *Od.* 14.508 where Odysseus' story constitutes an oblique request for a new cloak. Eumaeus compliments Odysseus on his *αἶνος* and says that his words will not be 'unprofitable' (*αἶνος μὲν τοι ἀμύμων, ὃν κατέλεξας, / οὐδέ τί πω παρὰ μοῖραν ἔπος νηκερδὲς εἶπες*, *Od.* 14.508–9). Eumaeus even calls Odysseus a 'suppliant' (*ἰκέτην*, 511), thus acknowledging Odysseus' inferior (discursive) position. In addition, one may note the Homeric epithet *πολύαινος*, specific to Odysseus and usually translated as 'much-praised' but explained by Hesychius as *πολύμυθος* (*LSJ* s.v.). Thus Nagy (n. 7, 1979), 240, §19, n. 1: 'Odysseus is *poluainos* in that he can speak about many things *in code*' [emphasis in original].

¹⁵ In this connection, it is worth noting that the ur-fabulist Aesop is assigned the status of slave in the biographical tradition. Phaedrus, moreover, provides an aetiology of the fable (*fabula/fabella*) which is conceptually consistent with this rhetorical function: the fable was invented, he says, to provide a coded form of speech by means of which a slave could speak his mind without fear of censure:

nunc fabularum cur sit inventum genus,
brevi docebo. servitus obnoxia,
quia quae volebat non audebat dicere,
affectus proprios in fabellas transtulit
calumniamque fictis elusit iocis.

(3. prol.33–7)

Now I will tell you briefly why the genre of fables was invented. Slaves, because they did not dare to say what they wished under threat of punishment, transferred their own thoughts into fables and eluded reproach through their contrived joking.

relations are embedded within this one term which expresses the paradox and ambiguity of the authoritative poet operating in a hierarchical society. The *ainos* thus enables Hesiod skilfully to perform the fundamentally problematic didactic task of criticising, without offending, the powerful.

Hesiod has thus encouraged us to engage with the tale of the hawk and the nightingale in a particular and particularly sympathetic way, but what message are we to draw from the tale itself and how are we to reconcile the two contradictory pronouncements? To understand that, we need to remember Hesiod's strategy throughout the extended opening of the *Works and Days* to 'reproduce the environment of the *Theogony*'¹⁶ and at the same time to rework elements from that poem.¹⁷ In particular, Hesiod's invocation of the kings at the beginning of the *ainos* is evocative of his representation of kings in the *Theogony*, especially in his account at the opening of that poem of the nature of the 'kings who are from Zeus' (ἐκ δὲ Διὸς βασιλῆες, *Theog.* 96) who settle disputes justly. To address the kings prior to the *ainos* as φρονέουσι καὶ αὐτοῖς also recalls the βασιλῆες ἐχέφρονες of *Theog.* 88 and the general godlike status of the kings whom the Muses honour and who are treated by the people like a god ('as he goes through an assembly they greet him like a god', ἐρχόμενον δ' ἄν' ἀγῶνα θεὸν ὥς ἱλάσκονται, *Theog.* 91), and the parallel is underscored by the conceptualisation of Zeus as king of the gods in both poems: Ζεὺς δὲ θεῶν βασιλεύς (*Theog.* 886, 897, 923; *Op.* 668).

Hesiod's evocation of the *Theogony* in the *Works and Days* is particularly evident in his retelling of the 'revised' version of the Prometheus story, and it is this story which is crucial for understanding the *ainos*.¹⁸ The explicit presentation of the vengeance of Zeus against Prometheus is appropriate to the *Theogony* whose central narrative is the recitation of the challenges to and triumph of Zeus. Unlike the *Theogony*, however, the punishment of Prometheus is not described in the *Works and Days*, where the focus is on Pandora and her jar which provide an aetiology for human misery. By omitting this concluding narrative element, Hesiod leaves the story unfinished, as it were, initially frustrating the reader's expectations. However, having been encouraged to interpret the *Works and Days* through the prism of the *Theogony*, a careful reader

¹⁶ R. Hamilton, *The Architecture of Hesiodic Poetry* (Baltimore, 1989), 55.

¹⁷ E.g. the first, and one of the most remarked upon, instances of Hesiod's revision of, and commentary on, the *Theogony* is his reformulation of the meaning of *ἔρις* at the opening of the poem. See M. Gagarin, 'The ambiguity of *Eris* in the *Works and Days*', in M. Griffith and D. J. Mastronarde (edd.), *The Cabinet of the Muses: Essays on Classical and Comparative Literature in Honor of Thomas G. Rosenmeyer* (Atlanta, 1990), 73–83. Through the creation of a pointed lexical ambiguity, Hesiod redefines the concept of *ἔρις* from its unitary meaning in the *Theogony* into a double phenomenon appropriate to the perspective of the *Works and Days*. In particular, this duplication of *ἔρις* exemplifies the fundamentally ambiguous nature of human life in the post-Prometheus and post-Pandora world, and Hesiod's rereading of his own *Theogony* highlights and articulates the differences and divisions between human and divine existences. In other words, it is part of the 'ideology' of the *Works and Days* to incorporate elements of the *Theogony*, but to rework those elements in ambiguous terms appropriate for the inherently ambiguous nature of the human world which Hesiod is describing and in which he lives. Thus, I agree with J. S. Clay, *Hesiod's Cosmos* (Cambridge, 2003) who argues throughout for a complex and conscious interplay between the two poems. See, e.g., Clay at 6: '[W]hen the *Works and Days* alludes to the *Theogony*, it emphasizes both the differences and interconnections between the two poems and simultaneously brings to the surface their divergent but complementary perspectives that must be integrated into a larger whole.'

¹⁸ That the Prometheus story in the *Works and Days* purposefully alludes to the *Theogony* version is demonstrated by J.-P. Vernant, 'The myth of Prometheus in Hesiod,' in *Myth and Society in Ancient Greece*, tr. J. Lloyd (Atlantic Heights, NJ, 1980), 182–201.

of the 'new' poem anticipates an account of Prometheus' punishment to complete the Prometheus story of the *Works and Days*. As such, the αἶνος is positioned to function as the metaphorical completion of the *Theogony*'s story of Prometheus, and this completion is effected through specific correspondences between the *Theogony* punishment passage and the αἶνος which link the hawk with Zeus and the nightingale with Prometheus. This is particularly apt since the Prometheus–Zeus conflict hovers in the background of the *Works and Days* generally, and colours Hesiod's discussion of his own disputes.¹⁹

The pertinent passage is *Theogony* 521–5:

δῆσε δ' ἄλκυτοπέδησι Προμηθέα ποικιλόβουλον,
δεσμοῖς ἀργαλέοισι, μέσον διὰ κίων' ἐλάσσας·
καὶ οἱ ἐπ' αἰετὸν ὥρσε τανύπτερον· αὐτὰρ ὃ γ' ἦπαρ
ἦσθιεν ἀθάνατον, τὸ δ' ἀέξετο ἴσον ἀπάντη
νυκτός, ὅσον πρόπαν ἡμαρ ἔδοι τανυσίπτερος ὄρνις.

And he [Zeus] bound intricate-planning Prometheus with inextricable bonds, cruel chains, and drove a shaft through his middle, and set on him a long-winged eagle, which kept eating his immortal liver; but the liver grew back at night in every way, as much as the long-winged bird devoured in the whole day.

These two episodes—the punishment of Prometheus and the tale of the hawk and the nightingale—serve as *comparanda* on the use of power, and it is through an understanding of the αἶνος in relation to the Prometheus episode of the *Theogony* that the contradiction which Hesiod sets up between the αἶνος and his own assessment of it can be fully understood. Hesiod's two roles as internal character and external narrator are here conflated in his simultaneous use of the two discursive modes of αἶνος and allusion. An allusion by its very nature functions analogously to the marker αἶνος by prompting a secondary interpretative level of reading parallel to the narrative, offering commentary and critique for the sophisticated reader.²⁰ By rereading the Prometheus episode metaphorically through the didactic tool of the αἶνος, the αἶνος becomes an effective instrument in Hesiod's challenge to complacent assumptions about power as well as an effective component of an ethic which is not a prisoner to power relations.

The lexical parallels between the αἶνος and the story of Prometheus are numerous. The hawk of the αἶνος and the eagle who serves as the instrument of Zeus's punishment are described in the same terms (τανυσίπτερος ὄρνις, *Op.* 212; *Theog.* 525). While τανυσίπτερος (and τανύπτερος) is not an especially rare compound, it

¹⁹ Hesiod shares a number of affinities with Prometheus. In particular, the relationship between Prometheus and his foolish brother Epimetheus echoes Hesiod's own relationship with Perses. J.-P. Vernant, 'Sacrificial and alimentary codes in Hesiod's myth of Prometheus', in R. L. Gordon (ed.), *Myth, Religion and Society* (Cambridge, 1981), 57–79, at 67 argues, moreover, that, as part of the recurring interplay between the *Works and Days* and the *Theogony*, Prometheus' dispute with Zeus has been replaced in the *Works and Days* narrative by Hesiod's dispute with Perses.

²⁰ This is in accord with Conte's analysis of allusion and imitation (G.-B. Conte, *The Rhetoric of Imitation: Genre and Poetic Memory in Virgil and Other Latin Poets* [Ithaca, NY, 1986]). Conte's later summarisation of the effect of imitation is applicable to Hesiod's strategy of self-imitation here: '[T]he use of models is not just an act of imitation but rather an act of communication, an indirect means of signifying; discourse agrees to speak with a voice that is doubled, making us see how something has already been said and how the author would like to say it differently, with a different emphasis and a different intention' (G.-B. Conte, *The Hidden Author: An Interpretation of Petronius' Satyricon* [Berkeley, 1996], 89).

occurs in Hesiod in these two places only, both times joined—not unexpectedly—with *ὄρνις* to fill the final half-line. The hawk's absolute power over the nightingale is made clear by the adverb *ἐπικρατέως* ('he, in his overwhelming might, addressed her', *τὴν δ' ὃ γ' ἐπικρατέως πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπεν*, *Op.* 206). Forms of the cognate noun *κράτος/κάρτος* in Hesiod are associated almost exclusively with Zeus and specifically denote his unconquerable status.²¹ Thus, *Κράτος* personified always remains seated beside Zeus (*Theog.* 388). Indeed, with the phrase *αἶ κ' ἐθέλω*, as West notes, 'the hawk's absolute power is described like a god's',²² and in fact shortly after the *αἶνος* the phrase *αἶ κ' ἐθέλησ'* is used of Zeus himself: 'he sees these things too, if he wishes' (*καὶ νῦν τάδ' αἶ κ' ἐθέλησ' ἐπιδέρεται*, *Op.* 268). In addition, the hawk's statement summarising the power that it possesses over the nightingale ('I will make you my dinner, if I want, or I will let you go', *δεῖπνον δ' αἶ κ' ἐθέλω ποιήσομαι ἢ ἐμestήσω*, *Op.* 209) matches the double fate of Prometheus, who serves as the eagle's dinner and is later released by Heracles (*οὐκ ἀέκητι Ζηνός*, *Theog.* 529, one might add). The hawk's characterisation of his own power as absolute, expressed as the capacity to perform diametrically opposite actions as he pleases, suggests that his power is on a par with Zeus' own power as described at the very opening of the poem (*Op.* 3–4):²³

ὄν τε διὰ βροτοὶ ἄνδρες ὁμῶς ἄφατοὶ τε φατοὶ τε
ρήτοὶ τ' ἄρητοι τε Διὸς μέγαλοιο ἔκητι.

Through him [Zeus] mortal men are both nameless and named, spoken of and unspoken, by the will of great Zeus.

Just as the hawk and Zeus share certain affinities, so too do the nightingale and Prometheus. The nightingale is described with the epithet *ποικιλόδειρος* (*Op.* 203) and, with an exclusivity even greater than the almost complete restriction *κράτος/κάρτος* to Zeus, forms of the stem *ποικιλ-* are used *only* of Prometheus—except for the nightingale in this passage.²⁴ In addition, this epithet is joined with

²¹ *κράτος/κάρτος* used expressly of Zeus (five times): *κάρτει τε μέγιστος* (*Theog.* 49), *κάρτει νικήσας πατέρα Κρόνον* (*Theog.* 73), *Κράτος* personified (*Theog.* 385), *κράτος ὕμῳ* (spoken by the Cyclopes, *Theog.* 662), *οἱ οὐ τις ἐρήρισται κράτος ἄλλος* (fr. 308.2); *κράτος/κάρτος* used of the Titanomachy (twice): *νίκης καὶ κάρτεως πέρι μαρνάμεθ'* (*Theog.* 647), *κάρτεως δ' ἀνεφαίνετο ἔργον* (*Theog.* 710). The verbal forms are used once of Zeus (*μέγα κρατεῖ*, *Theog.* 403) and once of the Titans (*ἐκρατύναντο φάλαγγας*, *Theog.* 676). *κάρτος* is also used once to describe a man who wins a contest under the auspices of Hecate (*νικήσας δὲ βίη καὶ κάρτει*, *Theog.* 437). Since Zeus's power is precisely what is at stake in the Titanomachy, nine of these ten occurrences are closely linked to Zeus. However, the adjectival forms *κρατερ-/καρτερ-* in the *Theogony* are not restricted to Zeus and are much more common: twenty-five occurrences describing, among others, the Giants, the Cyclopes, Cronos, and Typhoeus. These usages mark more generally the thematic contention over power in the poem and denote the threatening nature of Zeus's adversaries.

²² West 1978 (n. 1), 208. Cf. also *εὐτ' ἐθέλωμεν*, *Theog.* 28 (the Muses) and *ἐθέλουσά γε θυμῷ*, *Theog.* 443 (Hekate). See also Leclerc (n. 10), 42.

²³ Indeed, as 'king of the sky' the hawk is regularly associated in the Homeric poems with various gods, especially Zeus. See Isebaert (n. 4), 370 and 375.

²⁴ The only other instance in Hesiod occurs in the first mention of Prometheus (*Προμηθεΐα / ποικίλον αἰολόμητιν*, *Theog.* 510–11) where the term helps to define Prometheus' character, especially in contrast to his 'scatterbrained' (*ἀμαρτίνοον*, *Theog.* 511) brother, Epimetheus. West (n. 1, 1978), 206 asserts, moreover, that the use of *ποικιλόδειρον* to describe the nightingale is descriptively incorrect: nightingales do not have a 'mottled neck'. Pucci (n. 4), 77, however, understands the word to refer to the 'musical tones from the throat of the nightingale and the poet'. *ποικίλος* is, of course, another loaded term conveying notions of

the word for nightingale to fill the final half-line: ἀηδόνα ποικιλόδειρον, just as Προμηθεά ποικιλόβουλον (*Theog.* 521) does, the two figures thus being linked both by ποικιλ- and their 'names' in the same metrical position in the line. Finally, the plight of the nightingale 'pierced by crooked talons' (γναμπτοῖσι πεπαρμένη ἀμφ' ὀνύχεσσιν, *Op.* 205) evokes Prometheus' predicament: '[Zeus] driving a shaft through his middle' (μέσον διὰ κίον' ἐλάσσας, *Theog.* 522).

The introduction of allusive elements from the Prometheus story into the αἶνος has the effect of equating the actions of Zeus with the hawk and the sufferings of Prometheus with the nightingale. Indeed, when Hesiod turns from the αἶνος proper to Perses and asserts that justice triumphs over ὕβρις, he concludes by saying 'only by experience does the foolish man recognize this' (παθὼν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνω, (*Op.* 218),²⁵ a dictum which parallels Hesiod's concluding comment on the earlier Prometheus/Pandora episode of the *Works and Days*: 'but once he had the evil thing he realized what he had received' (αὐτὰρ ὁ δεξάμενος ὅτε δὴ κακὸν εἶχ' ἐνόησεν, *Op.* 89).²⁶ Moreover, Prometheus had incurred Zeus' wrath 'because he tried to contend in his schemes with the mighty son of Kronos' (οὐνεκ' ἐρίζετο βουλὰς ὑπερμενεί Κρονίῳνι (*Theog.* 534),²⁷ and the entire *Theogony* episode (including the Pandora story) is summed up by Hesiod thus: 'So it is not possible to deceive or escape the mind of Zeus' (ὥς οὐκ ἔστι Διὸς κλέψαι νόον οὐδὲ παρελθεῖν, *Theog.* 613).²⁸ The hawk expresses similar sentiments: 'He is a fool who wishes to set himself against the stronger' (ἄφρων δ' ὅς κ' ἐθέλη πρὸς κρείσσονας ἀντιφερίζειν, *Op.* 210). Hesiod thereby places the hawk's appraisal of the consequences of challenging the powerful on a par with his own evaluation as the authoritative commentator on the Prometheus/Pandora episode. However, this is an evaluation which, in the context of the αἶνος, Hesiod immediately and explicitly rejects.

Why does Hesiod reach such antithetical conclusions in these two thematically similar contexts? Is the αἶνος an implicit criticism of Zeus? The poet's reverence for Zeus and the piety he exhibits throughout both the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days* are obvious and pervasive. Nevertheless, Hesiod recognizes the capriciousness of divine power which can be exercised arbitrarily, or at least the inscrutability of divine motivation which makes that exercise of power *appear* arbitrary. (The opening lines of the poem [*Op.* 2–8] describing Zeus's power provide sufficient evidence of this.²⁹) The diametrically opposite assessments made by Hesiod between the Prometheus and the nightingale episodes must be predicated upon his realisation of the difference between the divine and the human contexts of those episodes. The initial reading of

craftsmanship, elaborateness, complexity and cunning. As such, it would be metaphorically apt for both Prometheus and the poet, and it may even be said to evoke the multivalent nature of the αἶνος itself.

²⁵ Note also the use here of νήπιος which should recall the kings who do not understand or listen to Hesiod (*Op.* 40) since the one other example of νήπιος prior to this passage describes the baby-like Silver Race (*Op.* 131). It is only after this point that Hesiod refers to Perses as νήπιος (*Op.* 286, 397, 633). (In a final instance, Hesiod uses the word to criticise the type of lazy farmer who does not prepare his wagon in a timely fashion [*Op.* 456]).

²⁶ West (n. 1, 1978) notes the congruence of thought.

²⁷ The use of ἐρίζετο here is also noteworthy: in the *Theogony* the contention is between Zeus and Prometheus, the advocate of humans; in the *Works and Days* ἔρις is contention between humans.

²⁸ Just as the version in the *Works and Days* does: οὕτως οὐ τί πη ἔστι Διὸς νόον ἐξαλέασθαι (*Op.* 105).

²⁹ Cf. also *Op.* 483–4: ἄλλοτε δ' ἄλλοιός Ζηνὸς νόος αἰγιόχοιο, / ἀργαλέος δ' ἀνδρῶσσι καταθητοῖσι νοῆσαι.

the *ainos*—prior to the poet's external commentary—has, by its evocation of the Prometheus story, a grounding in an outlook on power proper to the *Theogony*. Hesiod's ensuing commentary supplants that initial reading and finds its logical underpinning in the subsequent course of the narrative which articulates an outlook particular to the *Works and Days*, a moral evaluation of the use of power and its limits among humans.

A reevaluation of the *ainos* becomes explicitly necessary when Hesiod turns to Perses immediately following the hawk's internal (a)moralising and provides countervailing advice which contradicts the hawk's analysis of 'might makes right' by urging Perses to follow the dictates of justice over the use of arbitrary power. Having spoken in coded terms through the *ainos*, Hesiod says directly to his brother what he can only say obliquely to the kings: 'But you, Perses, listen to *Δίκη* and do not foster *ὑβρις*' (*Op.* 213). This advice leads to a broader discussion of the use of power, and it is here that the poet articulates a general theory on justice and offers a paradigm for human behaviour by setting in opposition the flourishing city under the just kings (*Op.* 225–6) and the suffering city where injustice reigns and the people pay for it (*Op.* 238–9). In concluding this discussion Hesiod returns expressly to the kings to warn them of the *Δίκη* of Zeus which follows on *ὑβρις* and recklessness (*Op.* 248–9):

ὦ βασιλῆς, ὑμεῖς δὲ καταφράζεσθε καὶ αὐτοὶ
τήνδε δίκην . . .

O kings, you even yourselves contemplate this *Δίκη* . . .

This is the first address to the kings since the *ainos*, and the syntax mirrors that earlier apostrophe (*Op.* 202–3):

νῦν δ' αἶνον βασιλεῦς' ἐρέω, φρονέουσιν καὶ αὐτοῖς·
ὦδ' ἴρηξ . . .

And now I will tell an *ainos* for kings who themselves understand. Thus the hawk . . .

ὦ βασιλῆς matches the earlier βασιλεῦς'; the verb of cognition καταφράζεσθε recalls φρονέουσιν; and both lines end with the virtually identical καὶ αὐτοὶ/καὶ αὐτοῖς in emphatic position. What is most noteworthy is that ὦδ' ἴρηξ has been 'replaced' in the later passage by τήνδε δίκην. The hawk is textually *erased* and supplanted by justice: *Δίκη*, a system regulating power relations, is substituted for the *ἴρηξ*, a manifestation of *ὑβρις* and arbitrary power. What has been articulated metaphorically and problematically in the *ainos* is now restated explicitly about the kings' purview and the proper use of power, particularly their treatment of a personified *Δίκη* whose weeping and flight to Zeus, moreover, recall the nightingale.³⁰

It is in this section that Hesiod also establishes an equivalence between himself and *Δίκη*. He displays a special knowledge of its function and nature, and they both serve as intermediaries between humans and Zeus: he imparts the 'will of Zeus' throughout the poem (explicitly stated at *Op.* 661) in the reverse of *Δίκη*'s imparting the sins of men to Zeus (*Op.* 260). Like the nightingale and Hesiod, *Δίκη* may be mistreated, but this is contrary to the will of Zeus. Thus Hesiod creates a nexus between himself and Zeus through *Δίκη* which posits a countervailing and morally superior relationship to

³⁰ See A. Bonnafé, 'Le rossignol et la justice en pleurs (Hésiode 'Travaux' 203–212)', *BAGB* (1983), 260–4.

Zeus than that which exists between Zeus and the hubristic gift-devouring kings—a relationship they enjoy due to their status as ‘Zeus-fostered kings’ as articulated in the *Theogony*.³¹ In that poem, by means of phrases such as ἐκ δὲ Διὸς βασιλῆες (*Theog.* 96) and διοτρεφέων βασιλῶν (*Theog.* 82, 992), Hesiod had posited an intimate connection between kings and Zeus. However, these sorts of phrases are notably absent from the *Works and Days*.

The αἶνος had presented a mode of behaviour similar to Zeus’s but which, in the human world, constitutes ὕβρις. However, by replacing the hawk and its ὕβρις with δίκη, Hesiod has now put Zeus on the side, not of strength, but of justice. Having articulated the operating assumptions of the gift-devouring kings (*Op.* 39), Hesiod now destroys the moral underpinning which they might have assumed for their actions as representatives of Zeus. The asymmetry between the two actors in the αἶνος is underlined by the juxtaposition in successive lines (in the same metrical position) of the volitional ἐθέλειν (*Op.* 209–10):

δείπνον δ’ αἶ κ’ ἐθέλω ποιήσομαι ἢ ἐμθήσω.
ἄφρων δ’ ὅς κ’ ἐθέλη πρὸς κρείσσονας ἀντιφερῖζειν.

And I will make a meal of you, if I wish, or I will let you go. He is a fool who wishes to set himself against the stronger.

The conditional αἶ κ’ ἐθέλω, connoting absolute (divine?) power is restated in the relative clause to describe the weak (human?) who is a fool to contend with the powerful. The gulf between divine and human scopes of action is underscored. A good definition of ὕβρις, after all, is when a human tries to act like a god. It is noteworthy, therefore, that in the *Works and Days* the only other use of the stems κρατ-/καρτ- and κρατερ-/καρτερ- (besides ἐπικρατέως used of the hawk at line 206) describes the hubristic Race of Bronze just prior to the αἶνος (κρατερόφρονα θυμόν, *Op.* 147).³²

The αἶνος, juxtaposing the hawk’s violent action against the poet’s critical evaluation, functions as an analogue for Hesiod’s subsequent discussion of the just and unjust cities and his more general preoccupation with violence and justice in the larger narrative.³³ This broader narrative encompassing the αἶνος is bounded, on one hand, by the story of Prometheus and Pandora and of Zeus’s treatment of humanity and, on the other, by the behaviour of animals which closes this large section of the poem (*Op.* 274–85).³⁴ These later lines are included as a negative *exemplum* of how

³¹ διοτρεφέων βασιλῶν, *Theog.* 82 (cf. also *Theog.* 992). As G. Nagy, ‘Hesiod’, in T. J. Luce (ed.), *Ancient Writers: Greece and Rome* (New York, 1982), 43–73, at 57 observes: ‘the actions of Zeus are a model for the ideal king as visualized in the *Theogony*’.

³² Thus, while the terms describe (divine) power in the *Theogony* (see n. 21), in the *Works and Days* they mark (human) ὕβρις.

³³ Because the unjust city expands on the description of the future of the Iron Age first described just before the αἶνος, the αἶνος is implicated in the whole exposition of mankind’s decline and its present and future predicament. Indeed, poised between these two passages, the αἶνος exemplifies the negative character of the Iron Age. Cf. S. Osterud, ‘The individuality of Hesiod’, *Hermes* 104 (1976), 12–39, at 21: ‘The point of the *ainos* or fable is surely to illustrate the principle of conduct which prevails in Hesiod’s own generation; the fable is in other words the counterpart of the preceding portrayal of the race of iron.’

³⁴ West (n. 1, 1978), 209 sets off lines 213–85 (after the αἶνος and through this passage) as a separate section which he labels ‘The superiority of dike over hubris’. In M. L. West, *The East Face of Helicon: West Asiatic Elements in Greek Poetry and Myth* (Oxford, 1997), 319, however, he labels lines 202–85 (including the αἶνος) as ‘The justice of Zeus’.

humans should not behave, and in those lines Hesiod explicitly highlights justice as the *sine qua non* of human existence. Like the opening *μῦθοι* of the *Works and Days* where Hesiod explains how Zeus separated men from gods, here he explains how Zeus distinguished men from animals. The section introduced by the *αἶνος* thus situates the behaviour of humankind in opposition to both the divine and the animal worlds. By rejecting a divine *modus operandi* in the human context and by articulating the necessity for *δίκη* in the middle of a narrative which begins with the divine and ends in the rejection of animal behaviour, Hesiod locates human behaviour between the extremes of the absolute use of power in the divine world and the arbitrary violence of the animal world. In the middle realm of humanity, power must be regulated by justice.

Thus, the conjunction between the punishment of Prometheus and the *αἶνος*, coupled with the differing conclusions which Hesiod draws from the two tales, underscore the chasm which exists for Hesiod between the ways of god and the ways of man. Through the *αἶνος* Hesiod teaches that the gods may treat their adversaries differently than humans may treat each other and that the fundamental prerequisite for evaluating and regulating human interaction must be *δίκη*. *Κράτος* may dwell with Zeus in the *Theogony*, but in the *Works and Days* (257) it is *Δίκη* who is especially honoured on Olympus.

Columbia University, New York

MICHAEL J. MORDINE
mjml11@columbia.edu